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Venezuela and Russia Sign Nuclear Energy Deal

By Andrés Gaudín
After six months of electricity rationing that took a significant political toll on President Hugo
Chávez, Venezuela and Russia signed an ambitious agreement by which Russia pledged to
build a nuclear power plant in Venezuela and transfer certain nuclear technology to be used
exclusively for peaceful purposes. The commitment, which also included bilateral cooperation
in other areas—-finance (creating a Russian-Venezuelan bank), trade, housing construction,
military equipment, oil and technology provision—-makes the two countries what Russian
President Dmitri Medvedev called "strategic partners."
On Oct. 15, when the ink was barely dry on the 15 protocols signed in Moscow that
deepened the friendship between the two countries, Chávez and Medvedev let it be known
that they expected negative reactions from other countries-—"there could be those who
without reason are nervous about this," said Chávez in a veiled reference to the US-—but they
made it clear that there was no cause for concern because the agreement is transparent and
the plant that Venezuela will have will be used for scientific, not bellicose, purposes.
They were not mistaken. That same afternoon US State Department spokesperson Philip
Crowley was quoted by the Associated Press as saying, "Undoubtedly this is something we will
watch very, very closely."
Details of the agreement were not released. The governments did not disclose the amount of
the investment that Venezuela will have to make or how it will be repaid, the time anticipated
for constructing the plant, its generating capacity and when it will begin producing, or even
whether there will be one or two reactors.
Chávez only said that Venezuela needs to reduce it dependence on fossil fuels (oil and gas).
Medvedev said that he "would like to emphasize that our intentions are absolutely transparent,
and we only want our strategic partner [Venezuela] to have a full range of energy possibilities
because even though the country is rich in oil and gas it needs to develop new energy sources."
Crowley made his comments based on those few details and with many preconceptions,
despite knowing full well that building nuclear plants and transferring minimal technology had
become one of Russia's most lucrative commercial ventures and that it is not willing to "burn" a
good business alternative by violating the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
regulations. The transparency with which Russia has managed its agreement with Iran—-a
difficult client and one that the entire international community has its eye on-—is good proof of
that.

Crowley acknowledged that the new "strategic partners" have "every right, as does any
country, to pursue civilian nuclear energy," but, with a less-than-diplomatic attitude, he also
warned that "with that right come responsibilities, and we would expect Venezuela, Russia or
any other country...pursuing this kind of technology to meet all international obligations." And
he added that "the relationship per se between Venezuela and Russia does not worry us."
This time it was not Chávez but rather Foreign Minister Nicolás Maduro who responded to the
State Department spokesperson's comments. And he was as undiplomatic as Crowley. These
two second-level officials, a spokesperson and a minister, unnecessarily threw fuel on the fire of
the bad Venezuelan-US relations. According to Agence France-Presse, before going to the
heart of the matter, Maduro called Crowley's statements "insolent," and then added, "Like any
country in the south, or the world, Venezuela has the right to develop nuclear energy as an
alternative source, for peaceful uses. This gentleman [Crowley] should bite his tongue before
making certain judgments, because in the history of humanity the Yankees are the only ones
who have used nuclear energy to destroy others with their atomic bombs. Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, all of Japan, and the entire world make other comments from me unnecessary."
A few days later, on Nov. 11, a Spanish news agency EFE story included comments by
German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, which seemingly supported the Venezuelan's
words. That day, in a statement before the federal parliament, the minister repeated an earlier
request, one he will make again at the next NATO summit in Lisbon, Portugal, that the US remove
all the nuclear arms that it has stored in Germany since the Cold War, especially at the Buechel
air base in the German state of Rhineland-Palatinate (between 10 and 20 nuclear warheads).
"Although they will not be activated, those nuclear arms are a latent threat for Germany and for
Europe," said Westerwelle.
In its desire to attack Venezuela-—"more than an enemy...an obsession for the North
Americans," wrote Argentine political analyst Atilio Borón—-it is likely that the State Department
lost its bearings when Crowley said that the "the relationship per se between Venezuela and
Russia does not worry us." Beyond, way beyond, the fact that Venezuela might, sometime in the
future, perhaps when Chávez is no longer in the Palacio Miraflores, have one or two nuclear
reactors, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's spokesperson overlooked two fundamental points of
the agreement that should concern the US.
First, it is clear from what little is known about the details of the agreement, that Russia and
Venezuela made a commitment for the exploration and exploitation of Venezuela's uranium
and thorium deposits, two minerals that, along with plutonium, can be used to produced
nuclear energy. In Venezuela, thorium is found in the Cerro Impacto, a reserve in the jungle
region of southeastern Bolívar state, which was declared a "national heritage" in the 1970s just
after the thorium deposit was discovered.
"It is a very rich deposit," said Venezuelan nuclear expert Eduardo Greaves. Currently no
commercial nuclear reactors use thorium, but "there are plans to build [such plants], and Russia
is ahead on this front, much further ahead than the US," said Greaves in an interview with the
state Agencia Venezolana de Noticias (formerly the Agencia Bolivariana de Noticias).
Second, the agreements' value for Russia is not merely commercial but includes issues of high
strategic significance, something that, in its desire to confront, was also overlooked by the State
Department.

One of the 15 documents signed by Chávez and Medvedev establishes that the Russian state
oil company Rosneft will pay US$1.6 billion for the 50% stake that the state Petróleos de
Venezuela (PDVSA) has in the German company Ruhr Oil GmbH (the other 50% of the company
that is engaged in refining, distributing, and selling oil derivatives is in the hands of Britain's BP).
Eduard Khudainatov, president of the Russian oil company, said, "With this agreement.
Rosneft will have 18% of the refining capacity in the heart of industrialized Europe." This was
another significant detail that Crowley failed to mention.
As political analyst Juan Carlos Doyenart told the Uruguayan daily Últimas Noticias, "I know
that Mrs. Clinton, being the hawk that she is, would be capable of saying even the
unimaginable, but I think that she would never say the foolish things that her spokesperson says."
IAEA once recommended nuclear energy for Venezuela
The precursor to the agreement signed in Moscow by Chávez and Medvedev was the letter
of intent approved in Caracas by the Venezuelan president and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin on Dec. 26, 2008. That agreement, published in the Gaceta Oficial on May 4, 2009,
established that both countries would agree to jointly produce the components and materials
for use in the nuclear reactors and radioisotopes for industrial, medical, and agricultural
application.
In any event, on that occasion, Chávez did nothing more than deal with an unresolved
matter dating from 1978, when the IAEA recommended that the Venezuelan government
consider using nuclear energy, since IAEA studies indicated that hydroelectric generation would
peak in 1993 and then come to a standstill, putting the brakes on the country's development.
The IAEA prediction was confirmed 32 years later, on Jan. 12, 2010, when the government
had to implement severe electricity rationing, which was not lifted until June and remained in
effect until July 30 for the public sector. Beyond the 40% increase in consumption in the last four
years, it is clear that all the presidents since the IAEA's prediction-—Carlos Andrés Pérez (19741979, 1989-1993), Luis Herrera Campins (1979-1984), Jaime Lusinchi (1984-1989), Octavio Lepage
and Ramón José Velázquez (1993-1994), and Rafael Caldera (1994-1999)-—were negligent and
condemned the country to a situation of energy depletion that will not begin to correct itself
until the day the Russian-built nuclear plant begins producing.

